Is Restricting Weapon Shipments to Israel While Supporting Ukraine & Taiwan Hypocritical?
In recent years, some have argued that restricting arms shipments to Israel while providing extensive military support to Ukraine and Taiwan reflects an inconsistency in U.S. foreign policy. The basis for such a discussion lies in the fact that nations under threat of aggression ought to be equipped militarily with the ability to defend themselves from invasion. This concept has been applied very broadly to Ukraine and Taiwan by the United States, although there are increasing conditions when it comes to applying it to Israel. Such a situation is particularly important since Israel is not threatened in an isolated way; it is surrounded by a region of hostile actors that includes Iran, which backs Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
The events of October 7, 2023, demonstrated the seriousness of this threat. In their assault on Israel, Hamas and other armed groups killed about 1,200 people and abducted 253 others. After the attack, Hezbollah, an Iran-backed terrorist group, opened another front along Israel’s northern border, while the Houthis launched attacks on both Israel and commercial ships in the Red Sea. The U.S. Department of State has shown that for years Iran was funding, arming, and training Hamas, arming Hezbollah, and maintaining military relations with other terrorist organizations in the region. However, although the State Department did not find any indication that Iran had knowledge of the October 7 attack before it happened, it concluded that Iran’s long-term assistance made it possible for Hamas to build up its military forces.
The significance of this network is that it completely changes the nature of the threat facing Israel. Iran has established what can be described as a system of proxy warfare. Hezbollah, with its missile capabilities, operates out of Lebanon; Hamas operates from Gaza; and the Houthis have demonstrated their capability to not only threaten Israel but also commercial vessels passing through international waters. This means that Israel’s security dilemma cannot be divorced from Iran’s broader military strategy in the region. When Iran directly threatened Israel using drones and missiles in April 2024 and once again in October, it was no longer simply an instance of proxy warfare but a direct conflict. By June 2025, there was yet another direct military engagement between Israel and Iran, leading to the involvement of the United States against Iranian nuclear sites.
This is exemplified by the case of Ukraine. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United States provided military aid worth tens of billions of dollars with the intention of helping Ukraine defend itself against aggression that threatened its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The rationale behind this military aid is simple: when a state does not have the means to defend itself against aggression, its sovereignty becomes dependent on whether other states choose to respect it. This is also the same principle involved in the case of Taiwan. There has been no full-scale invasion; however, decades have been spent enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities against coercive acts by China.
Therefore, arms restrictions on Israel would constitute a substantial case of inconsistency. Since the United States believes that it is appropriate to arm Ukraine due to the threat posed by Russia to the country’s sovereignty, and similarly believes that it is appropriate to arm Taiwan because of the potential threat to its sovereignty posed by China, the existence of a military network in Iran that actively assists attacks on Israel becomes equally relevant to Israel’s sovereignty and further military assistance.
The question here is not whether there is a complete similarity between the situations of Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan. It is whether the general policy of helping states under the threat of external aggression should be applied similarly regardless of whether the threat comes from conventional armies, proxies, or both. The presence of armed groups around Israel supported by Iran has complicated Israel’s security environment, and Iran’s direct attacks have shown that it is possible to move from a situation of proxy warfare into inter-state warfare. If the principles of sovereignty and self-defense provide the basis for continued military assistance to Ukraine and Taiwan, they also provide a basis for equipping Israel with the capability to defend itself against Iranian aggression and armed groups backed by Iran.
Support for Israel has become, for one of the first times in American history, a taboo subject. Nowadays, more members of the political establishment have come out denouncing Israel. In particular, arms shipments have become especially problematic, considering concerns about their use in the war in Gaza, as well as perceived issues in the U.S.'s defense stockpiles. This is also reflected in polling, as according to the Institute of Global Affairs on May 19th, only 16% of Americans want the U.S. to continue to supply Israel with weapons as they do now. However, when it comes to support for Ukraine, according to polling from The Economist, 60% of Americans want to keep sending foreign weapons to Ukraine. This gap is often also reflected in sentiment in Taiwan.
However, is it actually hypocritical not to support Israeli weapon shipments while supporting aid for the other two nations? The answer lies in the nuance of the different situations.
Israeli weapons have been used in a far different context than weapons in Ukraine and Taiwan. Ukrainian weapons have centered around artillery and air defense systems, like the M777 Howitzer and Patriot missile systems. These weapons are restrictive in nature and cannot be used to such a mass degree that they could level entire towns. Although the U.S. also gave Ukraine tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, these weapon systems still cannot be used to cause mass civilian casualties. Israel is a different story. According to the Quincy Institute on October 7th of 2025, Israel has now been approved to get Mark 84 and BLU-109 2000-pound bombs. This is significant because Israel has been reported to use these large bombs to flatten large buildings, which oftentimes have been hospitals or apartment buildings. According to Al-Jazeera on February 2nd, over 80% of hospitals in Gaza had these 2000 pound bombs dropped within a blast zone to them.
It wouldn’t be fair to compare the Israeli use of American weaponry to the Ukrainian use, as both nations have fought or are actively fighting in combat zones. One of the only reports of Ukrainian use of American weapons resulting in civilian casualties was reported by Russia on June 23rd, which accused Ukraine of using American ATACMs to hit a Crimean city, killing 4 people. Although the attack has not been denied by Ukraine, there have been no third-party reports confirming this. At the very least, most agree that Ukraine has been far more efficient in limiting civilian casualties compared to Israel, especially in regard to its use of American weaponry.
Looking towards another large benefactor of American weaponry, Taiwan has not even had an opportunity to use its American-made weapons systems in a war. According to the CATO Institute on November 6th, 2023, the majority of Taiwan’s American systems are conventional, like planes and tanks. The nuance is clear, however: in a war with China, it would likely be nearly impossible for Taiwan to leverage warplanes, like F-16’s, against the Chinese mainland, considering the numerical aerial advantage China possesses over Taiwan; this would likely limit civilian casualties on the Chinese mainland at the hands of American systems.
Although on the surface it may seem hypocritical to denounce the use of American weapon shipments to Israel, the difference is in implementation. Israel has shown that it is incapable of using American systems in a way that limits civilian casualties. America’s other recipients have done a far better job.